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Drawing on the experience of the operation of
customary law accumulated in common law
colonial and post-colonial African countries, I seek
to contribute some answers to two questions. The
first concerns the significance of the rule of law in
development; my tentative answer will be that it is
indeed significant, but not at all in the manner or
for the reasons sometimes supposed. The second
concerns the possibility of designing agendas for
research in law that may assist development; there
my conclusion is that only limited optimism is
justified.
1 The Rule of Law: A Conceptual
Framework for Discussion
We may initially note the perspective which is
usually adopted in debates about the rule of law.
This views the rule of law as arising from the form
and effectiveness of the law of the state. Law means
state law. State law is seen as a normative and
institutional system which is by and large
distinguishable from other social phenomena. State
law may have an effect upon these other, distinct
phenomena. This effect is generally seen as good in
so far as it entails the prevalence of the rule of law.
This perspective is often supposed to be that of the
practitioner working in the state legal system, or at
least is that which the foreigner with an interest in
aid and development expects the legal practitioner
to have adopted as an appropriate ideology for
working purposes. In reality the experienced
practitioner may be too well acquainted with the
other normative orders that affect deeply the lives
of his or her clients, and which are discussed
below, to believe the claim of the state to hold a
monopoly of the legal field.
This viewpoint, thus simply expressed, presents an
obvious problem with respect to African states. As
this article is concerned with common law systems
in Africa, the problem may be put in their terms,
although I believe exactly the same applies to all
other states. Common law is in origin an alien body
of norms. It was imported into Africa and now forms
the basis of the legal systems of many African states
notwithstanding local legislative amendment, as a
consequence of colonial domination (Doucet and
Vanderlinden 1994; Woodman 1995). Students
concerned with the rule of law thus must
acknowledge that the origins of state law were not
obviously conducive to the establishment of the
rule of law. But these foreign origins do at least
render the problem relatively clear-cut. The law of
the state is in its historical origins distinct from
most other aspects of social order in Africa. This is
the context in which debate still often occurs about
the rule of law and the means by which it may be
achieved. In this debate there is consideration of
devices (such as better training for the police)
which may make more effective existing law. There
are also calls to reform the law to make it more
commensurate with the needs of society, and thus
more likely to rule' social conduct.
These debates about the rule of law would, if no
additional elements were added, be based on an
excessively simple view of state law. State legal
systems in common law Africa do not consist
exclusively of received common law and a few local
statutory additions. They have all, from their
inception in the later years of the nineteenth
century or the early years of the twentieth, given
recognition to indigenous African customary laws.
'Recognition' means that state laws treat the
institutions or norms of customary law as if they
were institutions or norms of state law; giving effect
to them and enforcing them in the same way as the
institutions and norms of received law. Recognition
takes one of two forms. First, institutional recog-
nition of customary law occurs when institutions of
that law are incorporated into the state legal system,
as for example when customary chiefs become
administrative officials or judges of the state. The
British colonial policy of indirect rule is the best-
known instance. Second, normative recognition
occurs when norms of customary law are
incorporated into the body of norms of state law and
enforced by the state's institutions, such as courts.
Instances occur when state law provides that rights
in land may be transferred by procedures specified
by customary law, or that the inheritance of property
may be determined by customary norms.
This phenomenon in state laws gives rise to two sets
of issues. First, it appears that state law follows
social conduct in the field of recognition. The rule
of law or a semblance of it, and indeed development
in general, is sought not by bringing social conduct
into accord with the law, but by adjusting the law to
accord with existing social conduct. This poses a
conundrum for those who promote a simple notion
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of the rule of law as a potential producer of
development. But that is not the most important set
of issues raised by the phenomenon of recognition
of customary law. This arises from an implication of
the concept of recognition. State law, by explicit
recognition of customary law, acknowledges that
the latter already exists as law outside of, and prior
to state law. The state thus abandons the claim
mentioned earlier and acknowledges that it does
not have a monopoly of the legal world.
A further factor adding to the complexity of the
African legal world appears as a prominent theme
of research and theory concerned with recognition.
lt is found that the norms which the state legal
system declares to be 'recognised' and seeks to
enforce as customary law are often different from
the norms followed by those who observe
customary law in their social conduct. This has
been remarked upon and analysed elsewhere
(Woodman 1969, 1985, 1988). It may be noted
that the divergence between lawyers' customary
law and people's customary law is not primarily a
result of judicial misperceptions, although these
have certainly occurred; nor does it result to a great
extent from state decisions to over-rule particular
customary norms on policy grounds. lt is primarily
a result of the transformation that is inevitable
when a body of norms which has been observed as
part of the social order and enforced outside and
independently of any modern state institutions is
then adopted and enforced by the courts and other
institutions of a state.
To accept that lawyers' customary law does not
coincide with any other body of norms does not
require acceptance of the extreme view that all
customary law is 'invented' (cf. Chanock 1985).
Anthropological and other research show that in
many African social fields bodies of customary law
are observed. They may well have undergone
considerable change in the past century or so as a
result of increasing international contact. They may
have been affected by the proximity of state law and
its institutions. But they are not the creation of the
state, neither do they as a matter of historical fact,
trace their origins to colonisation.
The claim advanced here is not merely that the
word 'law' should be applied to some non-state
normative orders. That claim might be answered by
arguing that it is worthwhile to use terminology that
distinguishes between the normative orders of
states and other normative orders. Or it could be
said that it is preferable to adhere to the traditional
terminology which, it is sometimes alleged (although,
I believe, mistakenly), uses the term 'law' only for
the state's normative order.
The claim is that there is no clear distinction in
fact between the social phenomena referred to as
state laws and other social normative orders. This
claim stands in opposition to the admittedly
common assumption that the state's normative
order has such distinctive characteristics that a
terminological distinction must be drawn if words
are to correspond to our usual understanding
(Moore 1973; Tamanaha 1993). On the contrary, I
argue that state laws have no distinctive
characteristics that are not frequently displayed by
non-state laws, including, it is suggested, close
involvement with state institutions. Indeed, 1
would deny the existence of clear boundaries
around state law that might justify a distinction
between specific norms belonging to a system of
state law and other specific norms that did not.
This claim will be set out and demonstrated at
length elsewhere. Here I would appeal to the
observation that, in description and analysis of
African societies, it is very common to refer to
customary law when the object in question is not,
or is not necessarily an element in state law.'
This argument is not directed to a minor or
exceptional phenomenon. The admission of the
state that it does not make all law, and the
knowledge of people's customary law engendered
by research and everyday experience, lead to the
conclusion that there is a great deal of law which is
not state law. The claim of legal centralism that 'law
is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all
persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered
by a single set of state institutions' (Griffiths
1986:3), although often accepted by lawyers, is
erroneous.
For the present purpose I adopt the term 'law' to
refer to any set of observed social norms. This
includes the norms constituting the law of the state
(since these are usually observed by some of the
personnel of state institutions), including lawyers'
customary law, but it includes also the bodies of
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norms observed and enforced in practice outside
the courts and other institutions of the state.
This does not imply that any body of norms
remains static. On the contrary, according to much
observation there appear to be unceasing processes
of change in all legal orders. (Moor&s concept of the
semi-autonomous social field was in part an
attempt to incorporate a recognition of this fact of
change into the theory of legal anthropology: Moore
1973.) To conceptualise a body of norms as existing
unchanged for a substantial time may seem to be a
convenient device to aid the processes of study and
analysis, but it oversimplifies. When the truism that
all bodies of norms in the legal world are in states
of change is combined with the proposition that the
legal world includes many bodies of social norms in
addition to those of the state, the study of law as a
social phenomenon in any particular situation is
considerably complicated. Thus the choices open to
classes of actors, such as disputants and third
parties in disputing processes or parties to land
trans-actions, change over time, even for those
actors who conduct their relations exclusively in
terms of one body of norms, such as a particular
state law or a particular customary law. For
example, when a landholder permits another
person to occupy land for a limited time, the terms
of the grant may be determined by a customary law.
This law may specify at a certain period that land
may be granted for the cultivation of seasonal
foodstuffs in return for periodic prestations by the
grantee to the grantor to signify gratitude. But when
in a later period new commercial uses of land
become possible, there may be added to these terms
other customary law possibilities, such as a
sharecropping arrangement for growing cash crops.
Change such as this, which is internal to one law is
not the entire story. When different bodies of law
coexist, actors may have the opportunity to choose
between them. The available choices may also
change, becoming broader or narrower. It may, for
example, become accepted that land may be
granted on the terms of a common-law tenancy in
certain circumstances. But it may become accepted
that a common-law tenancy is the only appropriate
arrangement in some circumstances.
For the purpose of understanding change, it may be
helpful to use the distinguishing notions of
externally induced change and self-generated
change. However, it seems rarely possible to classify
in these terms particular instances, such as those in
the terms of landholding. It is likely that in all social
fields, everywhere, change is stimulated by external
contact, although it usually occurs only through
some degree of internal initiative. This suggestion is
relevant to the assessment of programmes for
development that are externally designed and driven.
2 The Significance of the Rule of
Law for Development
The preceding reflections on the manifestations of
law as a social fact may be related to the field of law
and development. Here we are concerned not with
theoretical analysis but with social action. The field
of study of law and development seeks to answer the
question whether, and if so, how law can induce or
facilitate development in low- and middle-income
countries (LMls). Development is today taken to
mean much more than an increase in Gross Domestic
Product. Some of the factors that have been
suggested to be features of, or in some way relevant
to, development need consider-ation, and it may be
helpful to consider the rule of law and rights.
2.1 The rule of law
The rule of law is nearly always counted a laudable
ideal. It is also routinely asserted that it means more
than simple adherence to legal rules. lt is thought to
entail some requirement that a substantial range of
human activity be regulated by general
prescriptions; and it is claimed that the need for
generality is incompatible with extensive
discrimination. However, it is also generally agreed
that the rule of law should not be confused with
other ideals such as that of democracy
The acceptance of a wide notion of law not limited
to state law, as advocated in the first section, requires
a further adjustment to the debates about the rule of
law. Much of the current discussion of the ideal
focuses exclusively on state law. Consequently, it is
concerned with impediments to the universal
observance of state law. On the view put here, the
rule of law cannot be limited to the rule of state law.
If the law of a state is largely disregarded because
subjects consider it to be an alien element enjoining
them to flout their own sense of right, but general
rules expressed in a customary law are largely
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observed, the conditions for the rule of law would
appear to be present. Thus, in respect of many
African countries where state law is largely a foreign,
implanted law, but customary law an effective factor
of local social cohesion, any additional empower-
ment of the state may result in a diminution in the
totality of the rule of law.
Where only state law is seen as true law, discussion
of the rule of law can become debate about the ways
in which state law can be made effective. There is
undoubted value in studying ways of ensuring that
powerful groups, and especially state governments,
can be subjected to the control of rules. But the
notion of the rule of law cannot be limited to
ensuring that governments obey the rules. The
notion also supports the demand that ordinary
subjects obey the rules: and when these rules are
made by the powerful, the ideal of the rule of law
can become a tool of totalitarian regimes.
We should consider just why we think the rule of
law is a worthy ideal. I doubt that it is because we
think that the state, through its law, should be
omnipotent. 1f support for the rule of law entails the
elevation of the state as an ideal in itself, many of us
would not wish for it. On the other hand, we have
a notion that it is desirable for government, groups
and individuals to conduct themselves according to
pre-determined, clear, known, accepted rules. As
Aristotle put it:
He who commands that law should rule may
thus be regarded as commanding that God and
reason alone should rule; he who commands
that a man should rule adds the character of a
beast.
The rule of law is both an ideal in itself and the
means whereby the individual may be enabled to
flourish through the guarantee of a stable social
environment in which the conduct of others is
relatively predictable.
But if this is so we must recognise that the rule of law
may be more nearly achieved in Africa by assisting
people to follow their customary laws, which are
clearer, better known and more acceptable to them,
than a remote and mysterious state law. lt is worth
noticing also that the notion of the rule of law is well
established in African customary laws. In particular,
the evidence about the different forms of chieftaincy
in the continent suggests that chiefs are identified by
customary law, their authority is conferred by
customary law, and their powers are defined and
limited by customary law. The rule of law applies to
chieftaincy This could be overlooked in the current
debates about chieftaincy, where there is a tendency,
even in discussion which purports to be legal, to
emphasise the political forces which sometimes
diminish and sometimes can be exploited by chiefs
to secure their political ends (van Rouveroy, van
Nieuwaal and Ray 1996; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal
and van Dijk 1999).
2.2 The notion of 'rights'
Today the effectiveness of rights is widely
characterised as an ideal. Even common law
countries have constitutions which confer or
recognise fundamental rights; even the UK has
enacted a Human Rights Act. This is not a suitable
place to question in depth such an overwhelming
trend in contemporary legal thought, but a few
comments must be made. Laws generally impose
obligations, both to do and to refrain from doing.
When an obligation is imposed upon one person
for the benefit of another, and certain other
conditions are present, that other is said to have a
right. But it appears that the concept of a right in
modern law is more than the expression of an
obligation from a different perspective. The
common idea is contained in the metaphor of the
trump card. Rights are trumps in the sense that,
unlike other advantages individuals may have, they
cannot legally be overridden by general social utility
(Dworkin 1977).
lt might be argued that the well-being of individuals
and their protection from oppression could be
secured at least as effectively by elaborating and
enforcing the standards of proper conduct by
governments and other powerful bodies as by
inventing rights on a slender philosophical
foundation and encouraging individuals to assert
them.
Perhaps a more significant objection in the present
context arises from the observation that systems of
customary law, in Africa as elsewhere, seem often
not to give prominence to, and perhaps not even to
include the concept of rights in the sense used by
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the proponents of human rights. Thus a group or
individual charged with the administration of
communal land is invariably expected to observe
certain standards of reasonableness in allocating its
use among members, but it is not common to find
a member asserting a right to a portion of
communal land. If the community head fails to
observe the appropriate standards, the expectation
is less that the individual right-holder will take
action as that the members generally will hold the
head to proper standards, or remove him or her
from the exercise of land allocation functions.
Again, customary law seems to speak little of rights
of inheritance but much of the factors which should
be taken into account when the property of a
deceased is distributed. In the West the rise of rights
seems irresistible. But this may be a culturally
specific concept. It may be a questionable strategy
for Western powers to press the notion upon
African states.
2.3 The state and development
When thinking about development takes seriously
the fields of legal activity outside the realm of the
state, problems are encountered in the existing
literature that are even more fundamental than
those already noted. Almost every set of develop-
ment proposals and even general discussions of
development assume that the type of activity that
potentially can assist development is action by or
within the institutions of the state. This is clearly
the case with almost all discussion from external
points of view (such as those at the workshop
where this article was originally presented as a
paper). It is the case with all discussion by
professional lawyers, whether indigenous or
foreign. Their training leads them, if concerned
with social change, always to think only of change
that may be produced through state law. The
increasing reliance on NGOs in aid and
development programmes does not alter this, since
NGOs in general rely on governments to secure the
conditions necessary for them to operate and to
provide some or all of the resources they need. In
consequence there is very little consideration of the
possibilities of producing development through
customary law. Prequently customary law is seen as
opposed to state law, through which development
will occur. Customary law is thus classed as a
potential impediment to progress, which the state
may have to remove. At best, customary law can
and should simply be ignored.
Since little thought has been given to ways in which
customary law may produce or hasten development,
it is difficult to assess its potential. However, there
may be factors that will open possibilities of realising
this potential. An object and a method of many
development programmes today is to empower
people generally to control events in their localities.
While the initial stages of local empowerment may
require some changes in state la it is to be
expected that development may subsequently occur
through action taken outside the sphere of the state.
Again, the current excitement about the notion of
globalisation could perhaps also be helpful in so far
as it emphasises the current and future potential of
external influence on LMIs, which by-pass the state.
It may not be helpful in so far as it is expressed in
terms of potential state intervention.
3 Implications for Research with
the Objective of Development
Some preliminary and general suggestions may be
put on the basis of these arguments.
First, studies limited to the modes of operation and
impact of state law alone are likely to be of limited
value. But it is not enough to recognise the truism
that the study of the formal sources of state law, of the
black-letter rules, is unlikely to assist development.
Socio-legal research is also unlikely to be
instrumentally successful if it is restricted to state law.
For example, in the field of land law it is clearly not
sufficient to demonstrate that case law shows the
ultimate title to land in a state or part of a state to be
vested in customary communities, and that statute
law subjects these communities' exercise of their
powers to control by a state Lands Commission. It is
no doubt necessary also to investigate how the
communities and the Lands Commission choose in
practice to exercise their respective powers. But this
is not enough. We need also to investigate the
practised customary law with regard to land use. We
might well find a good deal of local variation in this
customary law. The practised law may not always
accord powers to the customary community that can
appropriately be translated into the notion of an
ultimate title. When it does, it may also include
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norms governing the ways in which the powers of
the community are to be exercised. It may be found,
for example, that an allocation of land to a member
of the community or to a stranger is subject to the
fulfilment of certain conditions. These conditions
may be understood popularly in a standardised
form, but may include also a requirement that
disputes arising between a community leader and
the potential allottee must be subjected to a
customary procedure. (Some support for this and
other arguments alluding to land law in this article
may be found in Woodman 1996.)
Thus extensive research into practised customary
law is necessary
The second suggestion arises from factors just
touched upon. The population that observes a
particular customary law is usually a fraction of the
population of a state. Anthropological research often
shows that a small set of interrelated norms, such as
those regulating the relationship between the parties
to a pledge of land, observed in one locality may
differ from those observed for an almost identical
category of transactions in a community a few
kilometres distant. To put the point in crude but not
inaccurate terms, it could be said that, if a customary
legal order is defined as the totality of customary
norms which are observed by a population, it is
unusual to find a customary law for which the
population amounts to as many as a thousand.
This clearly has implications for research into
customary law and development. Research findings
may reliably support conclusions as to the current
state of legal relations and as to means of promoting
development, for a particular local community The
extrapolation of such conclusions to other
communities is unsafe. Conclusions about an entire
state are almost certain to be erroneous, unless they
relate to one of those rare activities that are
substantially regulated in practice by state law
alone. For example, conclusions about the
bureaucratic procedures of a state institution, such
as the documentation drawn up by a Lands
Commission in giving statutory consent to a type of
transaction, may be correct for the entire state. A
proposal to reduce the length of the documentation
procedure without changing its effect may be of
benefit to persons involved in the transactions. But
even this will not be true of all transactions of this
type, but only for those in which the statutorily
required consent is in fact sought.
Thus research into practised customary law in
many small localities is necessary
Third, if development is to be achieved, it will be
necessary to look for ways of producing social
change that do not rely on the effectiveness of state
law and institutions. Research may sometimes
suggest that, in a particular locality, action by state
institutions may stimulate development. This is
perhaps likely if the state has or obtains (possibly
from external providers) resources that are massive
in comparison with those available in the locality,
and is ready to expend them there. Such instances
are likely to be rare. We have developed little
understanding of how outsiders may assist to
produce development other than through the
instrumentality of the state.
Finally it may be suggested that an increased use of
carefully considered comparative study might be
beneficial, Anthropological discussion has much to
offer as to the possibilities of employing compar-
ative methods while avoiding ethnocentrism
(Benda-Beckmann 1984; Geertz 1983). The
implementation of highly localised research may
make this easier, since there is more likely to be
room for such comparative study between small
fields in close proximity
Notes
1. It may be suggested in passing that the autopoetic
theories of law developing in some European theories
today (e.g. Teubner 1993) are not helpful to socio-
legal analysis. Indeed, to see legal norms as elements
in legal systems, with the implications of bounded,
self-consistent bodies of norms with clear hierarchies,
may be unrealistic. lt would beg fewer of these
questions if we referred not to legal systems but to
'laws' and bodies of norms.
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